Max Stirner is generally considered a nihilist, anarchist, precursor to Nietzsche, existentialism and even post-structuralism. Few are the scholars who try to analyse his stands from within its Young Hegelian context without, however, taking all his references to Hegel and the Young Hegelians as expressions of his own alleged Hegelianism. This article argues in favour of a radically different reading of Stirner considering his magnum opus “Der Einzige und sein Eigentum” as in part a carefully constructed parody of Hegelianism deliberately (...) exposing its outwornness as a system of thought. Stirner's alleged Hegelianism becomes intelligible when we consider it as a formal element in his criticism of Bauer's philosophy of self-consciousness. From within this framework it becomes quite clear what Stirner meant with such notions as “ownness” and “egoism”. They were part of his radical criticism of the implicit teleology of Hegelian dialectics as it found according to him its highmark in Bauer. In short, this article puts the literature on Stirner into question and tries for the first time in 30 years to dismantle Stirner's entire undertaking in “Der Einzige und sein Eigentum” by considering it first and foremost a radical criticism of Hegelianism and eventually the whole of philosophy while fully engaged in the debates of his time. ☆ The author would like to thank Douglas Moggach for corresponding with me on the idea of the comic and for not sparing me his “critical criticism” in general. I'm also indebted to William Desmond and Lawrence Stepelevich for their comments on earlier drafts of this text. (shrink)

Max Stirner has often been considered a Young Hegelian, or even the 'last Hegelian'. Such a reading implies that Stirner drew the logical conclusions of Hegel’s philosophy, thereby ignoring the way his thought marks a fundamental break with the philosophical tradition as a whole. Stirner’s notions of 'egoism', 'ownness' and 'Der Einzige' ('the ego') were not philosophical concepts but, in a Foucauldian sense, tools to dismantle the subject-object dichotomy and its social and political bearings in the wake of modernity. It (...) is argued, furthermore, that his ideas cannot be reduced to a traditional philosophy of the subject (existentialism). This chapter analyses both Stirner’s quest to 'dissolve' philosophy, as well as its radical implications for political theory as a whole. Stirner’s notion of Der Einzige not only questions the revolutionary subject in a strictly Marxist sense, but eventually any form of (political) subjectivity. Stirner’s radical criticism of the emancipatory claims of his contemporaries allows us to question and rethink the concepts of contemporary social and political theory, not only by criticizing the way political power is commonly conceived and by refraining from positing essentialist guarantees, but also by laying bare the problem of political subjectivity. (shrink)

This translation makes available to the Anglophone world, for the first time, what is possibly Max Stirner’s final reply to his critics, entitled ‘Die Philosophischen Reactionäre’ (1847). The article was signed ‘G. Edward’, and its authorship has been disputed ever since John Henry Mackay ‘cautiously’ attributed it to Stirner and included it in his collection of Stirner’s lesser writings. If it is indeed Stirner’s final reply, then some of the main traits of Der Einzige und sein Eigentum are restated and (...) posited against those whom Stirner scornfully refers to as ‘the philosophers’. Since it was written almost three years after his magnum opus, it would offer a unique insight into Stirner’s own appraisal of the book in the wake of the ultimate demise of Young Hegelianism. Other than its obvious historical-philosophical significance, the text bears witness to Stirner’s own ‘spectrality’. The controversy over Stirner’s authorship is related to the inherently idiosyncratic nature of his thought. Stirner defies – and indeed mocks – all philosophical and theoretical conventions or categorizations. Yet, perhaps the controversy over Stirner’s authorship of ‘Die Philosophischen Reactionäre’ need not be settled after all: the mystery surrounding it only affirms the spectrality of the thinker who, in the words of ‘Edward’, one can ‘go crackers’ on. (shrink)

Scholarly research on Bruno Bauer (1809-1882) tends to focus on the continuity in Bauer’s writings throughout the 1840s, or situates the older Bauer’s conservatism well before the revolutions of 1848. This review article does not intend to settle this debate, but tries to enrich it by referring to the criticism of two of Bauer’s contemporaries: Karl Marx, and, in particular, Max Stirner. Stirner's critique of Bruno Bauer helps to illuminate the extent to which a creative rendering of Hegelian philosophy was (...) intertwined with distinct political positions, and distinct ethical programmes prior to the Revolutions of 1848. Stirner’s criticisms in fact, highlight, by way of contrast, central features of Bauer’s reformed Hegelianism. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the developments of Young Hegelianism in Restoration Prussia, with a special focus on Max Stirner’s radical critique of Hegelian thinking. It presents an overview of the history of Hegelianism in the 1830s and 1840s, and addresses the theoretical issues raised by Stirner’s attack in 1844. It examines important aspects of Young Hegelianism, including ideas of a modernized civic humanism and emancipation, and traces the Young Hegelians’ reconfiguration of Hegel’s thought in order to eliminate what they saw as (...) its conservative or insufficiently critical elements. The refurbished republicanism of the Young Hegelians took up the new challenges of the industrial age that was dawning in Germany, with special attention to the social question and the intransigent conflicting interests that typified the emergent economic order. Stirner’s critique is framed by its anti-humanist repudiation of Left Hegelian emancipatory projects. (shrink)